# The Distributed Discrete Gaussian Mechanism for **Federated Learning with Secure Aggregation**

# **Background: Differentially Private FL**

- While Federated Learning (FL) ensures raw data are kept decentralized, it may not provide formal privacy guarantees.
- **Differentially Private FL**: client updates (e.g. gradients) are **clipped** and **noised** appropriately to give quantifiable, user-level DP guarantees.

# **Privacy Models**

<u>Central DP</u>: Noise@Server

- Full trust on server
- Better utility



# Local DP: Noise@Clients

- No trust on server
- Poor utility



## Distributed DP (this work)

Aims to achieve the utility of Central DP without fully trusting the server by "distributing" trust:



# Some Challenges

- Secure Aggregation (SecAgg) operates on a **finite group** (integers with modular arithmetic)
  - Need **discrete** DP mechanisms
- **Sums** of Discrete Gaussians ≠ Discrete Gaussians • Need to carefully analyze the effects on DP
- **Communication** efficiency is vital for practical FL • Need to consider the trade-off against **privacy** 
  - and **utility** (both modular & quantization errors)



### 4. Local

Theorem 1 and  $Y \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{2}$ 

D

https://github.com/google-research/federated/tree/master/distributed\_dp



Summary: An end-to-end system for differentially private FL combining compression, SecAgg, and local noising that matches the privacy / accuracy of Central DP.

1. L2 Clipping: Initial bound on the client vector L2 sensitivity c

2. Flattening: Random unitary transform to spread values across vector dimensions  $\circ$  Controls the L-inf norm  $\rightarrow$  Lower quantization errors / Less modular wrap-around 3. Discretization: Round input values to the discrete grid (rounding granularity  $\gamma$ )  $\circ$  Corresponds to scaling by  $1/\gamma$  + rounding to integers

Scaling: Smaller  $\gamma \rightarrow$  Less rounding errors, but larger values (more communication) • **Randomized rounding:** Unbiased discretization (e.g. 4.2 to 4/5 with 80%/20% prob)  $\circ$  Norm inflation: Rounding may increase norm  $\rightarrow$  more DP noise for same privacy **Conditional rounding:** we give a tighter probabilistic bound and retry rounding until the norm is smaller (less DP noise).

$$eta$$
: rounding bias  $d$ : vector dimension  
Noising  $\Delta_2^2 := \min \begin{cases} c^2 + \gamma^2 d/4 + \sqrt{2\log(1/\beta)} \cdot \gamma \cdot (c + (c + \gamma\sqrt{d})^2) \end{cases}$ 

• Each client adds their own local discrete Gaussian noise • We give a **tight bound** on the sums of discrete Gaussians, which leads to **extremely close** privacy guarantees to central DP (central continuous/discrete Gaussian noise):

$$\begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \text{(Convolution of two Discrete Gaussians). } Let \ \sigma,\tau \geq \frac{1}{2}. \ Let \ X \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\sigma^2) \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2) \ be \ independent. \ Let \ Z = X + Y. \ Let \ W \leftarrow \mathcal{N}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\sigma^2+\tau^2). \ Then \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2) \ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \end{array} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2) \ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \end{array} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2) \ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \end{array} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(0,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array}$$
 \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{l} \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \\ \mathcal{L}\_{\mathbb{Z}}(1,\tau^2+\tau^2) \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array}

5. SecAgg: Securely sums locally clipped, scaled, rounded, and noised client vectors • SecAgg group size  $m = 2^{B}$  determines the communication bit-width (for the sum) • Scaling  $(1/\gamma)$  is chosen to keep modular wrapping infrequent (often <0.05% prob)

6. Server Post-Processing: Unscale and undo the flattening transform  $\circ$  Extension: may optionally collect metrics to update c and  $\gamma$  for the next iteration

# Google Research

# $ypprox \sum x_i$



# **Privacy Guarantee** $(\epsilon^2/2$ -concentrated DP, *n* clients):

 $au := 10 \cdot \mathbf{N}$ 

 $\varepsilon := \min$ 



# **Empirical Results**

**Stack Overflow Next Word Prediction** >10<sup>8</sup> training question/answer sentences grouped by >340k Stack Overflow users



Fig. 1. Our method matches the central continuous **Gaussian** if bit-width *B* is sufficient ( $\geq$  14).  $\delta$  = 10<sup>-6</sup>.



**Fig. 2.** DDG works in production-scale (1000 clients) and low-noise (utility-first) settings. z: noise multiplier.

## See full version (arXiv:2102.06387) for more!

# **Conclusion & Future Directions**

- Distributed DP achieves accuracy similar to central DP with only 16 bits per value
- Next steps: (a) Discrete Fourier Transform instead of Walsh-Hadamard Transform for better compression efficiency, (b) lower bound on communication, privacy, and accuracy trade-offs, (c) exploring the role of sparsity under distributed DP.